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AESTHETIC THEORY AND EDUCATION 
by 
Alan Tormey 
The relevance of aesthetic theorizing for humanistic education appears to be 
commonly conceded. However liberally construed, humanistic studies uniformly 
display recognition of the need for pursuing and justifying the sharpening of 
perceptual skills, the shaping of critical distinctions and the discrimination of 
aesthetically exemplary objects. 
So much seems unexceptionable. But we must pay, sooner or later, for the 
comfort these lofty aims afford. For in granting the relevance of aesthetic theory 
to our educational goals we provoke an avalanche of philosophical questions. 
And it is one of the merits of Professor Beardsley's paper that he confronts us 
with so perspicuous a view of both the significance and the complexity of these 
questions. Indeed, Beardsley's paper, like his problems, is rich, convoluted and 
provocative. But perhaps we can extract one or two issues for a closer look. 
Beardsley asserts that "What is needed to ground aesthetic education is a 
general way of looking at the arts." And he adds that "The sort of philosophical 
principle I have in mind would say what basic category works of art generally, 
or characteristically, or at their best, belong to-what is to be looked for in any 
work of art and can probably be found, at least in some degree." 
Now, such general ways of looking at the arts have usually been, or become, 
embedded in theories of art, as in familiar versions of the lmit.ation, Representa­
tion and Expression theories, all ,of which in large measure satisfy Beardsley's 
criteria for the sort of thing that he argues is needed to ground aesthetic 
education." 
But several difficulties are immediately apparent. If aesthetic education 
must be grounded in some such theoretical structure, what are the pedagogical 
consequences of picking a false or inadequate theory? Is the theory itself to be 
subjected to confirmatory of falsifying encounters through its heuristic 
applications'? And we may wonder, in the light of the dismal history of aesthetic 
theories to accommodate either the scope or the evolution of art forms, whether 
we can reasonably argue that "a general way of looking at the arts" is a necessary 
foundation for aesthetic education, since that would seem to imply that either 
there has been no aesthetic education or that it has thus far been inadequately 
grounded. Is it reasonable then to hope that with the failure of Imitation, 
Representation, and Expression theories of art the Semiotic theory, even with 
Goodman's extensive refinements, will fare any better here? More radically, we 
may nourish doubts about the very possibility of a single structured and 
coherent way of looking at the arts that will not prove fatally Procrustean as a 
"foundation" for aesthetic education. 
An astonishing truth about the art world is that the public, critics, and 
artists themselves often continue to dwell in the ruins of demolished theories. 
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Most notably, in our time, the Expression theory, whose inadequacies have 
been persistently exposed In the philosophical literature, continues to show 
signs of being alive and well in the pages of (inter alia) The New York Times and 
the Musical Quarterly. The painter Hans Hoffman talked to his students like the 
formalist one would expect him to be, but he reverted to the formulae of art-as­
expression when forced to discuss his work with journalists and other laymen. 
Yet other artists, as their statements attest, have consciously espoused and 
worked under the influence of theories of art. What then are we to make of all 
this? If an artist produces a work while in the throes of a theory, are we to take 
the work as exemplifying the theory? Or shall we insist that what artists do and 
what they think they are doing are, for aesthetic theory, mutually irrelevant? 
These are (or ought to be) familiar problems and I will make no effort to un­
ravel them here. Rather, the point I want to press is that the relation of artistic 
activity to aesthetic theory and thus, obliquely, to aesthetic education remains 
perplexing and obscure. Theories are not only imposed upon art and education as 
meta-critical structures, they are also embedded in those activities where their 
causal influence is enmeshed with other strands. (Consider the parallel manner in 
which theories of historical determinism have themselves become operative in 
the mechanisms of historical change). 
In light of these considerations, we should perhaps question the wisdom of 
resting our hopes for the successful development of artistic or aesthetic educa­
tion on the viability of particular aesthetic theories. Theories, after all, have re­
placed one another with distressing regularity, while artistic ability and aesthetic 
discrimination have continued to flourish and even to survive the more radical 
shifts of established paradigms of artistic significance. 
Let me suggest an analogy. Modifying Beardsley's suggestion slightly, we 
obtain the following proposal for education in the sciences: 'Whal is needed 
to ground scientific education is a general way of looking at the world.' And the 
sort of philosophical principle involved would, analogously,  involve notions of 
(say) substance, causation, and events, concerning which both ontic and formal 
commitments must be made. But the objections to this position are transparent. 
For, as Goodman has effectively reminded us, there is no single way the world is, 
and thus no privileged general way of looking at the world. True, there are com­
peting 'general ways of looking,' but these are invariably metaphysical structures 
and, as such, inappropriate as foundations for scientific education. Conversely, 
models of scientific activity that are appropriate are open to scrutiny from 
within the sciences, and the critical assessment of such models is itself a part of 
scientific education, not something external to it. Analogously, if the critical 
assessment of competing theories of art is an integral part of aesthetic education, 
such theories cannot then stand as external foundations of the enterprise. If 
there is no clearly privileged way of looking at the world, even less can there be a 
privileged way of looking at the arts; and I would urge that the role of aesthetic 
theorizing is not to "ground" educational policies and procedures but rather to 
provide model structures lo enable us better to develop critical and cognitive 
responses to our aesthetic experience. 
178 
3
Tormey: Aesthetic Theory amd Education
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1973
ALAN TORMEY 
II 
Since critical assessment of aesthetic theory is something that Professor 
Beardsley does so persuasively in his paper, I want to turn to a few questions 
generated by his discussion of Goodman's version of what Beardsley caJls the 
semiotic theory of art, by which he means ". . . the categorization of works of 
art as, in the broadest sense, signs-that is, carriers of meaning and/or 
reference." Additionally Beardsley notes that ''The art that has always been the 
most troublesome for any form of semiotic theory is the art of instrumental 
music." 
What evidently makes most instrumental music so refractory for a semiotic 
theory is its resistance to symbolic or referential interpretation. A great many 
predicates of course attach to such art works, literally and metaphorically, but 
it requires additional and perhaps suspect assumptions selectively to transform 
possession into reference. Yet that is precisely what Goodman's view requires. 
The underlying requirement (for Goodman) is that for art to have a signifi­
cantly cognitive import it must be a symbolic activity, and to be genuinely 
symbolic an art work must perform one or more of the various referential 
functions: description, representation, denotation, exemplification, or ex­
pression. There will be little argument that the first four of these are modes of 
reference, so let us concentrate on expression. Expression, for Goodman, is 
metaphorical exemplification, viz., if an art work expresses 4' , then it 
(metaphorically) possesses <P and refers to the label •q,• (Cf. p. 95LA). Suppose 
for example that a particular work , say Delius' A Song Before Sunrise could be 
said to be (metaphorically) nostalgic. [s it also then expressive of nostalgia? 
On Goodman's view it must. not only metaphorically possess the relevant prop­
erty, it must also refer to the label denoting that property. How then do we 
determine whether this referring fooction is satisfied and, consequently, whether 
the work is expressive of nostalgia? And here, where one might expect further 
criteria, Goodman issues a flat disclaimer that "No test for detecting what a work 
expresses has been sought here: after all, a definition of hydrogen gives us no 
ready way of telling how much of the gas is in this room." (p. 95,LA) 
But this comparison is misleading. A definition of hydrogen is at least relevant 
to the construction of tests for its presence, but Goodman's account of ex­
pression gives us virtually no help in distinguishing cases of mere metaphorical 
possession of properties from a full-blooded expression of them. Again, suppose 
the Delius piece to be metaphorically nostalgic. Does it express nostalgia? Only 
if it also refers to the label 'nostalgia.' But what determines that? Should we 
listen more carefully to the work? Is there perhaps something we've overlooked? 
No: clearly this is absurd. There is nothing in the set of phenomenal properties 
of the work that will disclose the presence or absence of referential relations. 
And Goodman offers no hint of semantic rules or regularities "that would indicate 
the existence of such relations. Presumably, not every property that is meta­
phorically possessed by an art work is also expressed by it. But since Goodman's 
theory provides no way of distinguishing cases of possession-plus-reference from 
mere possession, it leaves us with a vacuous distinction. (Nor will it help to be 
told that wherever there is expression there is reference, for what requires ex-
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plication here is not reference but expression.) And in the absence of indepen­
dent reasons for maintaining the distinction, reliance on the requirements of a 
disputed theory is not sufficient. 
(It is worth remarking, in passing, that it is curious that so consistent and 
rigorous a nominalist as Goodman should feel constrained to argue for the in­
flation of our talk about art with a plethora of referential relations, some of 
which at least are disposable in favor of more semantically economical alter­
natives. As Beardsley points out, it is not clear that Goodman's "Exemplifica­
tional Theory" has any conceptual advantages or educational consequences that 
are not available in views that can dispense with the cumbersome requirement 
that art be always symbolic and referential. And accounting for the expressive 
qualities of abstract instrumental music remains an instance where the thrust of 
Occam's razor cuts against the grain of Goodman's argument.) 
III 
Since I suspect that Beardsley would agree with many of these comments­
these as opposed i.e. to my earlier remarks-let me get on to some final 
musings about education. 
Pursuing one of Beardsley's suggestions concerning the expansion of choice­
worthy alternatives through the activity of artists and performers I want to 
plead briefly for a somewhat neglected aspect of aesthetic education­
neglected, as you will see, because of its apparently reactionary implications. 
Beardsley is quite right of course to point out that "[artists and performers] 
have contributed to the potential freedom of humankind, in one of its most 
important dimensions: I mean the range of choice-worth things the world 
affords." But it would be wrong to infer that this expansion of freedom 
is distributive-that it means that there are no, or ever lessening restraints on 
what we can or ought to make of particular art works. Stravinsky once re­
marked that the most difficult decision he had to make when beginning a new 
work was not directed to what he would do, but to which among the available 
possibilities he should eliminate. The "freedom" of his artistic choice was then 
often equivalent to the necessity to restrict the range of live options. Stravinsky 
was neither unique nor peculiar in this. Such constraints are pervasive, and are 
characteristic of artistic activity; and there is every reason to insist that com· 
parable constraints are essential to effective critical and appreciative response. 
Not everything is an appropriate response to King Lear, or to Bluebeard's 
C<l$tle, or to Clockwork Orange. In aesthetic, as in moral education, possibilities 
abound for logically and emotionally inappropriate attitudes. Just as there are 
occasions of guilt, resentment, and indignation that are unapt, unjustified or 
inappropriate, there are judgments of taste and responses to art works that are 
analogously misguided, and an approach to aesthetic education that would aim 
at generating a fondness for or an "appreciation" of art through the encourage­
ment of unrestricted response to it is as invidious as an educational psychology 
that aims at inspiring respect for other persons without regard for the quality of 
their actions or their moral character. 
To insist on this point is, of course, but one more way of arguing for the 
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indispensability of cultivating cognitive abilities through our acquaintance with 
the arts. The view is understandably unpopular, since it places discipline on a par 
with intuition, thinking on a par with perceiving. But the alternative is not a 
rival theory aesthetic education, but no aesthetic education at all. 
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